To whom does the law speak? Canvassing a neglected picture of law’s interpretive field

Among the most common strategies underlying the so-called indeterminacy thesis is the following two-step argument: (1) that law is an interpretive practice, and that evidently legal actors more generally hold different (and competing) theories of meaning, which lead to disagreements as to what the law says (that is, as to what the law is); (2) and that, as there is no way to establish the prevalence of one particular theory of meaning over the other, indeterminacy is pervasive in law. In this paper I offer some reflections to resist this trend. In particular I claim that a proper understanding of law as an authoritative communicative enterprise sheds new light on the relation between the functioning of the law and our theories of interpretation, leading to what can be considered a neglected conclusion: the centrality of the linguistic criterion of meaning in our juridical interpretive practices. In the first part of the chapter I discuss speech-act theory in the study of law, assessing its relevance between alternative options. Then I tackle the ‘to whom does the law speak?’ question, highlighting the centrality of lay-people for our juridical practices. Lastly, I examine the consequences of this neglected fact for our interpretive theories

Smart Contracts in Insurance: A Law and Futurology Perspective

Smart contracts are innovative contracts that differ from traditional ones in that they are self-executing, as they entail the possibility of representing contract terms in programming code that gets automatically executed on a blockchain or other distributed ledgers. Following the latest developments in blockchain technology, smart contracts have been the focus of growing attention and are currently among the major innovations that are taking place in financial services. This paper investigates the scope for their application in insurance both in the near and longer term, exploring the legal challenges that they pose. The analysis shows that in the near term smart contracts will be mainly exploited to automate underwriting, claims handling and payouts. It considers how the automation of these processes will operate at law and emphasises the impact that smart contracts can have especially on the reduction of transaction costs and on the very essence of the insurance contract—the insurer's promise to pay. Building on current technological developments, the paper then turns to role that smart contracts can play in insurance in the longer term, advancing the prospect of the automation of the entire insurance contract. In particular, it argues that the interaction between smart contracts and artificial intelligence and machine learning can challenge traditional frameworks of thought such as incomplete contracting and, in the farther-distant future, will culminate in contracts that will both self-interpret and self-enforce their terms—what can be called the true smart contracts. The analysis identifies and addresses the main legal issues that can arise in this context, exploring how to strike a balance between the goal of fostering innovation and the need to ensure policyholder and investor protection

Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars

Autonomous or “self-driving” cars are vehicles that drive themselves without human supervision or input. Because of safety benefits that they are expected to bring, autonomous vehicles are likely to become more common. Notably, for the first time, people will share a physical environment with computer-controlled machines that can both direct their own activities and that have considerable range of movement. This represents a distinct change from our current context. Today people share physical spaces either with machines that have free range of movement, but are controlled by people (e.g. automobiles) or with machines that are controlled by computers, but highly constrained in their range of movement (e.g. elevators). The movements of today's machines are thus broadly predictable. The unrestricted, computer-directed movement of autonomous vehicles is an entirely novel phenomenon that may challenge certain unarticulated assumptions in our existing legal structure. Problematically, the movements of autonomous vehicles may be less predictable to the ordinary people who will share their physical environment--such as pedestrians--than the comparable movements of human-driven vehicles. Today, a great deal of physical harm that might otherwise occur is likely avoided through humanity's collective ability to predict the movements of other people. In anticipating the behavior of others, we employ what psychologists call a “theory of mind.” Theory of mind cognitive mechanisms allow us to extrapolate from our own internal mental states in order to estimate what others are thinking or likely to do. These cognitive systems allow us to make instantaneous, unconscious judgments about the likely actions of people around us, and therefore, to keep ourselves safe in the driving context. However, the theory of mind mechanisms that allow us to accurately model the minds of other people and interpret their communicative signals of attention and *122 intention will be challenged in the context of non-human, autonomous moving entities such as self-driving cars. This Article explains in detail how self-driving vehicles work and how their movements may be hard to predict. It then explores the role that law might play in fostering more predictable autonomous moving systems such as self-driving cars, robots, and drones